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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOWLING CLUB, a non-profit 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Petitioner and .Appellant, 
-vs.-
LAMONT F. TORONTO, Secretary 
of State of the State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No.10253 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, a non-profit corporation organized 
under the laws of the State of Utah, appeals from a 
decision of the Secretary of State revoking the charter 
of the corporation for violations of the Utah Liquor 
Control Act. rrhe action of the Secretary of State was 
eoute~ted in the District Court, Third Judicial District, by 
writ of f'ertiorari and upheld. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respo11de11t agrees to the statement of appellant 
as to the disposition of the instant case in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the Sec-
retary of State and its affirmance by the Third Judicial 
District Court, revoking the appellant's charter, should 
be upheld by this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts: 
The Secretary of State, pursuant to notice, issued 
an order to show cause why the charter of the Bowling 
Club, a non-profit private corporation, should not be re-
voked and the $5,000 bond forfeited to the State of Utah 
for violation of the Utah State Liquor Control Act (R. 2). 
At the time of the hearing the only appearance made by 
the Bowling Club was a motion to quash for failure of 
proper notice (R. 2). No other objection to the pro-
ceedings was raised nor did the Bowling Club examine 
any of the witnessrs who were present or otherwise offer 
evidence on the issue. 
An audiogn1phic record of the proceedings before 
the Secretary of State is attached to the instant record. 
2 
Generally, the evidence discloses that Mr. William N. 
Brady, an investigator of the Federal Alcohol and Tax 
Division, on the 7th day of April, 1964, entered the 
Bowling Club and purchased several alcoholic drinks con-
taining Bourbon and Scotch whisky on a retail basis. 
Further, he was given a pink guest card which would 
admit him to the Bowling Club on other occasions. On 
April 8, Mr. Brady returned to the Bowling Club and 
purchased another Bourbon and 7-Up for 50c. There-
after, he purchased five additional drinks from the bar-
tender. On May 25, Mr. Brady returned and purchased 
five additional drinks containing intoxicating liquor at 
the bar on the club premises. Later on that day he re-
turned to the club with officer Allen B. Clark of the Salt 
Lake City Vice Control Division and the wife of Sgt. 
Johnson of the Salt Lake City Vice Squad. They pur-
chased several drinks of intoxicating liquor, including 
Rcotch and Vodka. The same thing occurred on the 17th 
of June, 1964, at which time Mr. Brady purchased a 
half-pint of whisky from the bartender at the Bowling 
Club. 
Subsequently, on the 18th day of June, 1964, a search 
warrant was obtained from the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
District Judge, and at 4 :30 p.m., a search of the prem-
ises of the Bowling Club was made and 75 bottles more 
or less of alcoholic beverages were seized. Subsequently, 
a hearing in the case entitled, "Utah Liquor Control 
Commission v. 75 Bottles More or Less Seized From the 
Premises of That Certain Establishment Known as the 
Howling Club," was had. The :findings of fact and con-
3 
clusions of law of that hearing are appended to the rec-
ord on appeal. rrlrn court expressly found that alcoholic 
beverages ·were being served on a retail drink-by-drink 
basis at the Bowling Club, and that alcoholic beverages 
were being stored on the premises for the purpose of 
illegal sale in violation of Title 32, U.C.A. 1953. The 
court ordered the seized alcoholic beverages forfeited. 
The evidence concerning the purchase of alcoholic drinks 
on a retail basis and the search of the premises of the 
Bowling Club was all received by the Secretary of State 
without objection from anyone representing the Bowling 
Club. All of the witnesses who appeared and testified 
did so without being administered any formal oath. All 
the witnesses, however, indicated that they recognized a 
duty to tell the truth and intended to tell the truth. No 
objection was made to the failure of any witnesses to be 
sworn. Based upon the evidence, the Secretary of State 
determined that the Bowling Club had violated the pro-
visions of the Utah Liquor Control Act, and ordered the 
club charter forfeited. The appellant sought certiorari 
from the District Court which was ultimately denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
rrHE FAIL URE OF WITNESSES TESTIFY-
ING AT 'l1HE HEARING BEFORE THE SEC-
RJ1JTARY OF srrATE TO BE SWORN DOES 
NOT VITIATE THE PROCEEDINGS. 
At the time of the hearing before the Secretary of 
State, each of the witnesses that were called were ad-
4 
vised that they should tell the truth and indicated that 
they intended to do so. None of the witnesses were given 
formal oaths. No one on behalf of the appellant objected 
to the procedure nor objected to the testimony. 
16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
'' • • • The secretary of state shall hold a 
hearing, after notice, for purposes of determining 
whether a club or association incorporating or 
opera ting under this chapter is organized or op-
era ting in accordance with the law. Notice shall 
be sufficient if sent by registered mail to the prin-
cipal place of business or to any of the officers of 
such club or association. If it is shown after a 
hearing that any such club or association (1) was 
actually organized for pecuniary profit, (2) was 
used for gambling or other purposes in violation 
of any law or ordinance inluding, but not limited 
to, violations of the Liquor Control Act, as amend-
ed, ( 3) has failed to maintain or make available 
to the secretary of state a record of its member-
ship, or ( 4) has failed to procure and file with the 
secretary of state, within the time herein pre-
scribed, and maintained in good standing a bond 
ns herein provided or has failed to file and/or keep 
on record with the secretary of state a copy of its 
constitution, bylaws and house rules which must 
be in conformity with the requirements of this 
chapter, or has failed to conform to or abide by 
such constitution and bylaws and house rules, the 
secretary of state shall revoke the charter of such 
corporation.'' 
It is obvious that the Secretary of State acts in an 
administrative capacity and that the hearing is not a 
formal trial. Even if it were, it is well settled that the 
failure of a party to object to the failure of a witness to 
5 
be administered an oath precludes any claim of error or 
prejudice. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., ~ 1819, notes: 
''This modern practice does not abate the ordi-
nary rule that the failure to make an objection to 
competency at the proper time is a waiver (ante, 
~~ 18, 486). Hence, if a ~witness who has not taken 
the oath is by inadvertence put on the stand, the 
opponent's subsequent discovery and objection 
should not avail! * * * '' (Emphasis added) 
In Richards v. Hugh, 51 L.J.Q.B. 361 (Canada 1882), 
it was ruled that the failure of a party to object because 
a witness was not sworn was a waiver of any irregularity. 
In People v. McAdoo, 184 N.Y. 304, 77 N.E. 260 (1906), 
a hearing was held before a police commissioner. A wit-
ness was not sworn. The New York Court of Appeals 
ruled that where the party was aware of the failure to 
swear the witness and failed to object, no claim of error 
could be sustained. See also Sears v. United States, 264 
Fed. 257 (1st Cir. 1920); In re DaRoza's Estate, 82 Cal. 
App. 2d 550, 186 P. 2d 725 (1947). In the instant case 
counsel for the appellant were present during the whole 
hearing, made no objection to the proceedings, and de-
clined to take part in the hearing, apparently relying on 
the motion to quash. It is apparent, therefore, that no 
claim of error can be predicated on the failure of the 
witneRses to be sworn because no objection was made. 
Secondly, it should be noted that 16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, 
in no way requires that witnesses that may appear should 
be sworn. It does not purport to make such a require-
ment mandatory or even permissively empower the Sec-
retary of State to swear witnesses. Administrative pro-
6 
ceedings are generally not required to maintain the same 
formality as court trials. Davis, Administrative DOIW, 
~ 14.01. 'l1he appellant contends 78-24-16, U.C.A. 1953 
is applicable. That section provides: 
''Every court, every judge, clerk and deputy 
clerk of any court, every justice, every notary pub-
lic, and every officer or person authorized to take 
testimony in any action or proceeding, or to decide 
upon evidence, has power to administer oaths or 
affirmations." (Emphasis added) 
It should be noted that that section is perm1ss1ve, 
not mandatory. The section does not require that oaths 
be administered in administrative hearings. The general 
rule is that in the absence of a mandatory statute a failure 
to swear witnesses does not invalidate the proceedings. 
Thus, in 73, C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies, § 127, 
it is noted: 
"It has been held that, where the administra-
tive body is authorized to administer oaths, all 
witnesses must be sworn, but the swearing of wit-
nesses may be waived, and, where the statute does 
not require that the sworn testimony of witnesses 
be taken, a failure to swear the witnesses does not 
invalidate the proceeding.'' 
See Wilson v. Township Committee, 123 N.J.L. 474, 
9 A. 2d 771; Amen v. City of Rahway, 117 N.J.L. 589, 
190 Atl. 506.. In Duffard v. City of Corpus Christi, 332 
f;.\V. 2d 447 ('l1ex. 1960), an action was brought attacking 
stred paving assessments. Texas law required a public 
hearing before the City Council. Oaths were not given 
7 
the witnesses. The court stated on appeal attacking the 
proceedings : 
"Appellants attack the proceedings before the 
City Council on account of alleged irregularities 
therein, because the witnesses were not sworn, be-
cause the Council permitted leading questions, 
because witnesses gave testimony based upon con-
clusions and hearsay, aud because the expert wit-
nesses who testified as to the enhancement of the 
value of property abutting on the improved street 
were not in fact experts. These contentions must 
be overruled. The rules as to the examination of 
witnesses are relaxed in administrative proceed-
ings, and where the statute does not require that 
sworn testimony be taken, a failure to swear the 
witnesses does not invalidate the proceedings. 
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Pro-
cedure§ 127, p. 450; State ex rel. Townsend v. City 
of Mission, rrex. Civ. App., 329 S.W. 2d 98." 
See also 3 Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award,§ 109; 
Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581. 
Consequently, since nothing makes the requirement 
of an oath mandatory, and since appellant did not object 
or participate in the proceedings before the Secretary, 
there is no merit to the contention that the failure to ad-
minister an oath to the witnesses vitiated the proceed-
ings. Especially is this true where a certified copy of a 
court judgment and findings was received which action 
showed the appellant had been judicially determined to 
have violated the Liquor Control Act. 
8 
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POINT II. 
'l1HE PROVISIONS OF 16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, ET 
SEQ., RELATING TO THE POWER OF THE 
SECRETARY OJ.i-, STATE TO FORFEIT THE 
CHARTER OF A NON-PROFIT CORPORA-
TION \VAS NOT REPEALED BY THE EN-
A CTM:ENT OJi-, 32-8-7, U.C.A. 1953, ALLOWING 
A COURT TO REVOKE A CORPORATE 
CHARTER ON CONVICTION FOR VIOLAT-
ING THE LIQUOR CONTROL ACT. 
rrlie appellant contends that the provisions of 16-6-13 
and 13.l, U.C.A. 1953, which allow the Secretary of State 
to forfeit the charter of non-profit liquor locker clubs 
and forfeit the bond required to be posted under 16-6-13.1, 
U.C.A. 1953, were impliedly repealed when the Legisla-
tnre enacted 32-8-7, U.C.A. 1953. Chapter 8 of Title 32 
is part of the Liquor Control Act and provides penal-
ties for the violation of the Act. In 1959 the Legislature 
amended Section 32-8-7, U.C.A. 1953, and it now reads: 
''Every person who violates any of the pro-
visions of section 32-7-1and32-7-7 shall be impris-
oned for not less than three months nor more than 
six months or fined in an .amount not to exceed 
$1000 or both. Every corporation which violates 
any of the provisions of section 32-7-1 and 32-7-7 
shall be fined in an amount not to exceed $2500 
or have its charter revoked by a court of record 
or both.'' 
It should be noted that this provision covers both 
fH'ofit corporations and non-profit corporations, but pro-
vides for criminal penalties. Nowhere does the section 
say the bonding provisions of 16-6-13.1 are repealed or 
9 
that the Secretary of State's authority under 16-6-13 
and 13.1, which was provided for in 1955 (Laws of Utah 
1955, Ch. 25 § 1) is repealed. 'l1here is nothing inconsis-
tent about giving the Secretary of State administrative 
authority to revoke a charter and giving a court authority 
to revoke a charter on criminal conviction. The Secre-
tary might have access to more information than a court. 
Further, the court's power to revoke is based upon a 
conviction, whereas the Secretary may revoke without a 
conviction and does not have to depend on whether or 
not a sheriff or county attorney may press the matter. 
However, a more obvious reason for not finding an im-
plied repeal exists. In 1963 the Legislature amended 
the Non-Profit Corporation Act by enacting the Model 
Non-Profit Corporation Act. The sections (16-6-1-12, 
U.C.A. 1953) immediately preceding 16-6-13 were ex-
pressly repealed, whereas nothing was done about re-
pealing 16-6-13, et seq. Certainly, if the Legislature had 
intended these provisions to be no longer applicable, they 
would, at that time, have cleared the books of any ref-
erence to them. In fact, the Legislature did just the op-
posite and expressly said that 16-6-13, et seq., were not 
repealed. rrlrns, 16-6-111, U .C.A. 1953, enacted in 1963, 
provides: 
''Sections 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-13.3, 
16-6-14 and 16-6-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
pertaining to certain types of nonprofit corpora-
tions, shall in no way he deemed repealed in whole 
or in part by the provisions of this act and all 
n~ferenccs in said sections to corporations "incor-
porating," "incorporated" or "to be incorporat-
ed" under or pursuant to "this chapter" shall be 
10 
deemed to include such types of non-profit cor-
porations organized under this act or otherwise 
governed by the provisions of this act.'' 
Certainly, therefore, the Legislature could not have 
intended that 16-6-13, et seq., would be repealed by 32-8-7, 
U.C.A. 195:3, and obviously felt the former sections were 
still in effect. 
'I1he Legislature is presumed to intend to achieve a 
eo11sistent body of law. Sutherland, Statutory Construc-
tion,§ 2012, and subsequent legislation is not presumed to 
repeal prior legislation without an express intent. Suth-
erland, op. cit., §§ 2012 and 2014. 
This court has consistently refused to find an im-
plied repeal of an existing statute unless the later enacted 
statute is absolutely irreconcilable with the former. Glenn 
''·Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P. 2d 380; State Tax Comm. 
v. Board of Commissioners, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961; 
Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. 2d 761. In McCoy 
v Severson, 118 Utah 502, 222 P. 2d 1058 (1950), this court 
observed: 
"It is a rule of statutory construction that 
where there are two or more statutes dealing with 
the same subject matter they will be construed so 
as to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by 
implication is not effected unless the terms of the 
later enacted law are irreconcilable with the 
former. 
In Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 103 
Utah 186, 134 P. 2d 469 (1943), this court noted: 
'' * * * Whether there has been a repeal by im-
pliea tion is primarily a question of legislative in-
11 
tent, and it cannot be adjudgeu that there has been 
such a repeal unless the legislative intent clearly 
appears. People v. McAllister, 10 Utah 357, 37 
P. 578; State v. Carmen, 44 Utah 353, 140 P. 670; 
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P. 
96, 77 Am. St. Rep. 928; 59 C. J. 904 et seq.'' 
No intention to repeal 16-6-13, et seq., is found 
merely because a court on conviction is also authorized 
to revoke a charter. The Legislature obviously intended 
both authorities to exercise the power. One power is 
exercised in a criminal case, the other in a civil proceed-
ing. This is not inconsistency but consistency among the 
sovereign bodies. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the contention that 
the provisions of 16-6-13, et seq., have been impliedly 
repealed is without merit. 
POINT III. 
THE OPERATION OF THE UTAH LIQUOR 
CONTROL ACT IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 16-6-13 
AND 16-6-13.1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, DOES NOT RESULT IN A VIOLATION 
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The appellant contends that since Section 32-8-7, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides for a fine of $1,000 
against any individual violating the illegal sale provis-
ions of the Liquor Control Act and since the same pro-
vision subject a corporation to a fine of $2,500, these pen-
12 
alties, when coupled with the provisions of 16-6-13 and 
16-6-13.1 providing for forfeiture of a $5,000 bond on vio-
lation of the Liquor Control Act, result in the imposition 
of an Rxcessive fine in violation of Article I, Section 9, of 
the Utah Constitution. 
In the instant case it should be noted that there is no 
evidence of any criminal conviction or punishment as 
having yet been imposed. The appellant in its brief states 
tlrn t there was a case filed against the corporation which 
is still pending and for which a preliminary hearing has 
been scheduled for March 6, 1965. Consequently, there 
is no basis to contend an excessive fine is in any way 
inrnlved in the instant case, since no fine has in fact been 
imposed. Secondly, it should be noted that the corpora-
tion is a distinct and separate entity from the individuals 
who might be otherwise charged with violating the Liquor 
Control Act. Therefore, in determining whether any fine 
is excessive, it would not be proper to add the indi-
vidual fines to the corporate fines. There is no showing 
that any individual has been charged with violating the 
Liquor Control Act or is otherwise subject to a fine for 
conduct arising out of the same incidents as formed the 
basis for the revocation of the corporate charter. 
It should be noted that in State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 
442, 226 Pac. 674 (1924), this court indicated that the pen-
alty provisions in the nuisance section for violating the 
Liquor Control Act were not necessarily the same thing 
as a fine but rather were a statutory penalty in the nature 
of a tax. Consequentlly, it would appear that the pro-
\1s1011 of lG-6-13 and 13.1, relating to the forfeiture of 
13 
a corporate bond, are not fines to be eonsidered iu deter-
mining whether or not an excessive fine has been imposed. 
Supporting this proposition is the decision of this court 
in Disabled American Veterans v. Toronto, 12 U. 2d 213, 
364 P. 2d 830 (1961). In that case the petitioner contend-
ed that since the corporation was fined $1,000 upon its 
plea of guilty for violation of the liquor law, the Secre-
tary of State should not have ordered the forfeiture of its 
bond. The court stated: 
'' * * * We find no merit to such argument. The 
bond was given for the express purpose of ensur-
ing compliance with the laws of the State of Utah 
and was subject to forfeiture upon a revocation 
of the charter of a corporation for a violation of 
such laws. The action of a court in fining appel-
lant upon a finding of guilt for a liquor law vio-
lation can in no way affect appellant's liability 
under its bond given to the Secretary of State as 
a condition to being allowed to maintain premises 
upon which liquor could be stored or consumed.'' 
It seems obvious that in the absence of a showing 
that, in fact, any fine has been imposed, the appellant is 
in no position to complain of a constitutional violation. 
Even so, it is obvious that a $2,500 fine coupled with a 
bond forfeiture is not excessive. In 24B C.J.S., Criminal 
Law, 1978, it is stated: 
"'I1he eourts are reluctant to say that the leg-
islature has exceeded its power in authorizing 
excessivP fines, a11d as a general rule will not do 
so except in a very clear case, and, therefore, the 
widest latitude should be given to the discretion 
aud judgment of the legislature in determining the 
14 
l 
amount necessary to accomplish the object and 
purpose it has in view. 
''In determining whether a fine authorized by 
statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due 
regard must be had to the object designed to be 
accomplished, to the importance and magnitude 
of the public interest sought to be protected, to 
the circumstances and the nature of the act for 
which it is imposed, and in some instances to the 
ability of accused to pay, although the mere fact 
that in a particular case accused is unable to pay 
the fine required to be assessed does not render 
the statute unconstitutional. 
''In order to justify the court in interfering 
and setting aside a judgment for a fine authorized 
by statute, the fine imposed must be so excessive 
and unusual, and so disproportionate to the of-
fense committed, as to shock public sentiment and 
violate the judgment of reasonable people concern-
ing what is right and proper under the circum-
stances.'' 
See specifically Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34 
and Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 840, 56 S.E. 149, 
where both courts determined that the imposition of fines 
for each sale in violation of the state liquor control act 
was not unconstitutional as being an excessive fine. With 
the instant legislation the Legislature is endeavoring to 
control the sale, distribution and use of liquor and in 
an effort to do so, it has imposed strong measures. How-
ever, these penalties, when weighed in light of the Con-
stitution and the penalties fixed for other crimes made 
punishable hy both the state and federal governments, 
make it manifest that it is not excessive. In State v. 
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Franklin, supra, this court quoted with approval the deci-
sion of State v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953, in 
which the court there observed that the forfeiture and 
sale of personal property used in maintenance of a liquor 
nuisance was not in violation of the constitution as being 
an excessive fine or unusual punishment. It is apparent, 
therefore, that there is no merit for the contention that 
the constitutional provision against excessive fines is vio-
lated in the instant case. 
As to the contentions and assertions of appellant 
that other clubs are violating the State Liquor Control 
Act, it may be noted that a particular number of prose-
cutions have been undertaken. Further, there is no 
showing that in any particular case the Secretary of State 
is discriminating in his application of the law. It may be 
that the present State Liquor Act is unworkable from an 
enforcement standpoint, but this is a matter for the Leg-
islature and not a matter for this court to declare by ju-
dicial fiat that it is henceforth permissible to violate the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised on appeal in the instant case afford 
the appellant no basis for the contention that the for-
feiture of its charter was not proper. The record was well 
documented to support the conclusion that the State 
Liquor Control Act was violated by the appellant in an 
open, notorious and flagrant manner. Appellant did not 
participate in the proceedings before the Secretary of 
State and, therefore, is foreclosed of complaining of any 
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irregularity that may have occurred. Even so, it is ob-
vious that the complaint registered by the appellant af-
fords no basis for relief. The contentions of the appel-
lant, when analyzed against the facts and law, make it 
manifest that this court should affirm the judgment of the 
trial court and the Secretary of State. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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